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Awarding Punitive Damages in Medical
Malpractice Arbitration
INTRODUCTION
The issue of awarding punitive damages in medical malpractice
arbitration is of growing concern to the legal community.' Arbi-
tration, especially in medical malpractice, has become quite in-
strumental in disposing of claims and disputes.2 Consequently,
California, in response to the medical malpractice "crisis,"'3 has
encouraged the use of arbitration as one means of resolving the
"crisis." 4
Punitive damages are generally awarded to deter wrongful con-
duct by punishing a defendant who has acted in a particularly
I. "[T]he issue of whether arbitrators [of medical malpractice disputes] may
award punitive damages is rarely confronted and has not been resolved." Bassis, 4r-
bitration of Medical Ma/practice Disputes-Some Problems, INS. L.J. 260, 267 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Bassis].
2. The severe problems confronting the medical profession polarized state
attention to these medical malpractice issues. Consequently, state legisla-
tures have adopted a variety of programs incorporating both substantive and
procedural changes in existing law in order to temper the malpractice crisis.
These remedies have included. . . establishing either complusory or volun-
tary arbitration plans.
Id. at 263 (footnote omitted).
3. A detailed analysis of the medical malpractice crisis is beyond the scope of
this Comment. However, a brief outline of the general aspects attributed to the crisis
may be useful.
The basic components of the medical malpractice crisis may be summarized as
follows:
1. Drastic increases in medical malpractice claims.
2. Astonishing increases in the size of malpractice jury awards.
3. Heavy increases in insurance premiums for malpractice.
4. Continual withdrawal of medical malpractice insurers.
5. Consequential increases in the cost of medical services to the consumer.
6. Greater incentive for frivolous claims, due to excessive jury awards.
7. Defensive medicine practiced by increasing numbers of physicians.
8. Breakdown of trust and conducive attitude between physician and
.tients.Congestion in the courts, overloaded dockets.
Butler, Jr., Arbitration: An Answer to the Medical Malpractice Crisis?, 9 BEv. HILLS
B.J., 41, 67-70 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Butler]; Bassis, supra note I, at 262; Novick,
Medical Malpractice: Arbitrating Disputes L.A. LAW. March 1979, at 34, [hereinafter
cited as Novick].
4. "In the 1975 Extraordinary Medical Malpractice Session of the California
Legislature, Assemblyman Keene introduced A.B. 1, which was enacted into law as
Chapter I of the Extraordinary Session." Butler, supra note 3, at 41 n.3. The bill was
signed by the Governor on September 3, 1975, and became effective on December 12,
1975. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982). The various requirements and
subsections of§ 1295 are not necessary to discuss as per their effect on this Comment.
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reprehensible manner.5 In California, since punitive damages are
permitted by statute,6 they are accordingly often awarded in ap-
propriate cases. 7 However, whether punitive damages may be
awarded in medical malpractice arbitration in California is
uncertain.
Recently, in Baker v. Sadick,8 a California Superior Court con-
firmed a medical malpractice arbitration award which granted the
plaintiff $300,000 in compensatory and $300,000 in punitive dam-
ages. Counsel for the defendant physician is protesting the confir-
mation, arguing that the punitive damage award should be
vacated. An issue on appeal will be whether the arbitrators ex-
ceeded the scope of their authority on this matter.9 Under Cali-
fornia law, an arbitrator who commands an act which is against
public policy exceeds his statutory authority. 10 Accordingly, the
focus of this Comment will be whether public policy in California
permits awards of punitive damages in medical malpractice
arbitration. I "
While California appellate courts have not ruled on this issue,
New York has made a decision on the public policy question in
commercial arbitration and thus serves as the leading jurisdiction
in this area. In Garrity v. Lyle Stuart Inc. ,12 the New York Court
of Appeals ruled that an arbitrator's award of punitive damages in
a dispute arising out of breach of contract was against public pol-
icy and therefore invalid.' 3
This Comment will address the countermanding policy consid-
erations California courts should consider when deciding the fate
of punitive damage awards in medical malpractice arbitration. A
discussion of medical malpractice arbitration will be followed by
an analysis of punitive damages. The effect of the Garrity deci-
sion will then be analyzed. Finally, the conflicting policies in Cal-
ifornia concerning the role of punitive damages in medical
malpractice arbitration will be discussed. This Comment will
conclude that an award of punitive damages through medical
5. See infra notes 53, 75 and accompanying text.
6. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1984).
7. See infra notes 47, 67 and accompanying text.
8. Baker v. Sadick, appeal docketed, No. 486735 (4th Cir. July 24, 1982); L. A.
TIMEs, June 26, 1982 at 3, part II, col. 1.
9. L.A. Times, June 26, 1982 at 3, part II, col. 1.
10. American & Nat'l Leagues of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n, 59 Cal. App. 3d 493, 498, 130 Cal. Rptr. 626, 629 (Ct. App.
1976).
11. This Comment will only address the issue of public policy. Other issues
which may serve to place limitations and barriers on the availability of punitive dam-
ages in medical malpractice arbitration are not discussed.
12. 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976).
13. Id. at 356, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
1984]
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malpractice arbitration is not contrary to California's public
policy.
I. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION
Binding arbitration 14 is a procedure through which disputing
parties agree to submit their controversy to an impartial third
party forfinal determination.15 Arbitration has existed for centu-
ries, but has only recently become a popular mechanism for
resolving disputes.' 6 One objective in California for the use of
arbitration is the remedial role it should play in the medical mal-
practice crisis.' 7
Arbitration may not be appropriate for every malpractice suit.
However, it does present several advantages that should be con-
sidered.' 8 Speed in resolution is a strong attribute of arbitration,
which is unquestionably a shorter process than a judicial proceed-
ing.19 Excluding time for appeal, medical malpractice litigation
14. In common usage "binding arbitration" refers to arbitration that parties
contractually agree to employ in resolving a dispute, and there is no appeal
from the decision except, essentially, upon grounds of fraud or gross miscon-
duct of the arbitrator. It is to be distinguished from "mandatory arbitra-
tion," which is compelled by statute or other governmental regulation (as
opposed to contractual agreement) and which may either be binding or
advisory.
Butler, supra note 3, at 42 n.6.
15. Arbitration is defined as "[tihe reference of a dispute to an impartial (third)
person chosen by the parties to the dispute who agree in advance to abide by the
arbitrator's award .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (5th ed. 1979).
16. Disputes have been resolved by submission to a respected neutral party
in Judeo-Christian societies for centuries and in ancient oriental cultures
long before the establishment of English common law. . . . [I]t has lain
dormant until the increasing backlog of cases waiting to be heard in the
normal judicial system has forced more and more attorneys and clients to
turn to this ancient problem solving technique.
Knight, Private Judging, 56 CAL. ST. B.J. 108 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Knight].
17. Butler, supra note 3, at 41.
18. Some basic comparisons between courtroom litigation and arbitration will be
helpful in analyzing California's advocation of arbitration in medical malpractice ac-
tions. Litigation is very formal with several requirements including: formal plead-
ings, pretrial procedures, trial by judge and jury, strict adherence to procedural
requirements and rules of evidence, judgment according to law, right of appeal, and
public access. In contrast, an arbitration "hearing" is private. There are no formal
pleadings; merely brief statements of dispute by the parties. There are no pretrial
procedures. The "hearing" is conducted by arbitrators specifically chosen by the par-
ties. The atmosphere and evidentiary rules are relaxed. The "award" does not neces-
sarily have to conform to the law, but more importantly is rendered according to
principles of justice and equity. Finally, there is no right of appeal, thus the award in
arbitration is almost always final.
See also Ladimer & Solomon, Medical Malpractice Arbitration.: Laws, Programs,
Cases, 653 INs. LAW. JOUR. 335, 336 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Ladimer & Solomon]
(discussing in detail the procedural distinctions between litigation and arbitration).
19. Nocas,Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims, 13 FORUM 254, 255 (1977)[hereinafter cited as Nocas]; see also Butler, supra note 3, at 60-61.
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may take from three to five years. 20 On the other hand, studies
indicate that arbitration of a medical malpractice dispute takes no
longer than six months to one year.2' Further, there is no time
factor for appeals since the arbitrator's decision is generally fi-
nal.22 In binding arbitration an arbitrator's award is reviewable
under very limited circumstances: such as exceeding the scope of
their authority, which is generally unlimited.23
Another attractive characteristic of medical malpractice arbitra-
tion is lower cost. Technical procedures, pleadings, and rules of
evidence are time-consuming and expensive operations which ar-
bitration eliminates. 24 In addition, all other incidental require-
ments necessary to prepare and execute a case, and the coinciding
attorney, court and other related fees, are accordingly reduced in
arbitration. 25
The absence of a jury and the presence of sophisticated special-
ists can be very beneficial in settling medical malpractice disputes.
In addition to eliminating lengthy and often misunderstood jury
instructions, arbitration avoids emotionally stimulated excessive
jury awards.26 Furthermore, unjustified claimants who frequently
20. Nocas, supra note 19, at 255; Butler, supra note 3, at 60.
21. Nocas, supra note 19, at 255; Butler, supra note 3, at 61.
22. See supra note 18.
23. "[Blinding arbitration decisions are virtually unappealable. When the parties
have agreed to submit a dispute to binding arbitration, any appeal from that decision
is extremely limited. . . . [A]ppeals can be taken from the final arbitrators' decision
only on the grounds of fraud and outstanding error." Butler, supra note 3, at 66
(footnotes omitted); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982). This sec-
tion specifically sets out upon what grounds the arbitrators' award may be vacated:
Subject to Section 1286.4, the court shall vacate the award if the court deter-
mines that:
(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(b) There was corruption in any of the arbitrators;
(c) The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct
of a neutral arbitrator,
(d) The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be cor-
rected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy sub-
mitted; or
(e) The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal
of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown
therefor or by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the
controversy or by other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions
of this title.
Id.
24. "Of particular relevance to the malpractice area, it is possible in arbitrations
to introduce textbook evidence to establish standard procedures and practices, rather
than to find appropriate experts, qualify them, obtain their testimony and cross-ex-
amine them." Butler, supra note 3, at 61.
25. Id.; Novick, supra note 3, at 40.
26. "The arbitration mechanism, however, certainly permits the use of a highly
sophisticated and competent decision maker as opposed to typically unsophisticated
5
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receive favorable judgments from sympathetic juries27 have less of
a chance of success in arbitration.28 The injured party with a legit-
imate claim should obtain adequate compensation in either fo-
rum. Unwarranted and excessive jury awards, however,
ultimately contribute to increased medical costs, and therefore are
not in the best interest of the public. 29 Although elimination of
unjustified and excessive damage awards may not be attractive to
the plaintiff, curtailing the sympathetic jury award problem must
be viewed as a positive feature.
Similarly, the relaxed procedural and evidentiary rules in arbi-
tration serve to promote a more equitable decision.30 Evidence
which ordinarily may be excluded in the courtroom may be per-
mitted in arbitration.3 1 Finally, arbitration proceedings are pri-
vate. Both parties in a medical malpractice suit will benefit from
limiting the public knowledge of personal matters brought out in
these actions.3 2 Whether or not all these advantages to medical
malpractice arbitration will in fact solve the "crisis" is hard to say.
However, it can be justifiably concluded that arbitration will con-
tribute to the resolution of the problem.
The use of arbitration as a means of settling disputes, especially
in medical malpractice, is favored in California law.33 In addition
to the legislative advocation of arbitration in medical malpractice
suits,34 the Supreme Court of California emphasized the func-
tional benefits of arbitration in the landmark case of Madden v.
Kaiser Foundation.35 In Madden, the plaintiffs challenged the va-
lidity of a contract allegedly binding them to arbitration for an
juries which may be more susceptible to emotional appeals." Butler, supra note 3, at
62.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. "An enlightened consumer of health services should consider whether sym-
pathy verdicts are really in his long run interest when such verdicts increase malprac-
tice insurance rates and are then passed on to him in the cost of health services." Id.
30. [P]roceedings in an arbitration procedure tend to be far more informal
and the technical rules of evidence may be relaxed. The atmosphere is gen-
erally one more suited to obtain all the facts and assess their import. Fre-
quently criticized and perhaps archaic rules such as the "hearsay evidence
rule" or the restrictions required to introduce expert testimony generally
have no application in an arbitration proceeding.
Id. at 63.
31. Id.; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
32. "Arbitration avoids adverse publicity for the defendant .... " Novick,
supra note 3, at 40.
33. Hawkins v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 413, 416, 152 Cal. Rptr. 491, 493
(Ct. App. 1979); Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 355-56, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 775, 782 (Ct. App. 1976).
34. The "Keene Bill" became law in 1975; see CAL. Civ. CODE § 1295 (West
1982).
35. 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976).
[Vol. 20
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action in medical malpractice. The court upheld the contract on
several grounds. 36 Of utmost importance was the court's conclu-
sion that arbitration is a preferable means of settling disputes.37
As the court stated, "We observe the growing interest in, and use
of arbitration to cope with the increasing volume of medical mal-
practice claims."'38
The decision by the Madden court upholding the arbitration
agreement for medical malpractice is an important one. Not only
did it serve to secure the validity of medical malpractice arbitra-
tion agreements, but more importantly, it served as a benchmark
for the policy of California to favor such agreements.3 9
In support of the Madden decision and the state legislature's
encouragement of binding arbitration in medical malpractice,40
the California courts maintain a "strong public policy" favoring
its implementation.41 It therefore seems that the California courts
will insure the viability of arbitration in the field of medical mal-
practice. However, these courts may soon be faced with a chal-
lenge to the power of arbitrators in medical malpractice cases,
which may hinder its attractiveness. At issue will be the ability of
claimants to obtain punitive damages through arbitration.42
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Punitive Damages in General
Punitive damages have a peculiar presence in the civil adver-
sary system in this country. In contrast to a criminal prosecution,
where punishment of the culpable party is the goal, the purpose of
36. [Tlhe court rejected plaintiffs three contentions: that the agent did not
have the authority to agree to arbitration, that the contract was one of adhe-
sion, and that the agreement to arbitrate was invalid since the parties had
not expressly waived their right to a jury trial.
Note, An Agent's Authority to Bind.A Princile to Arbitration, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 355
(1977).
37. Madden, 17 Cal. 3d at 708, 552 P.2d at 1184, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 888.
38. Id.
39. Hawkins v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 413, 416-17, 152 Cal. Rptr. 491,
493 (Ct. App. 1979); Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 355-56, 133
Cal. Rptr. 775, 782 (Ct. App. 1976).
40. "The Legislature has also acknowledged arbitration to be proper, if not a
desirable, method of resolving medical malpractice claims .... " Hawkins, 89 Cal.
App. 3d at 416, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 493 (citations and footnote omitted); "This policy
also finds expression in recent legislation (Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1141.10, 1295)." Beynon
v. Garden Grove Medical Group, 100 Cal. App. 3d 698, 704 n.4, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146,
149 n.4 (Ct. App. 1980).
41. Benyon, 100 Cal. App. 3d at 704, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 149; see also supra note 39
and accompanying text.
42. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
1984]
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civil litigation is to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries.4 3 Ex-
emplary damages, however, are awarded as a "punishment" as-
pect of tort actions in courts throughout the nation. 44 Such
damages are granted in addition to general damages which fully
compensate the plaintiff for his injuries.45 These damages have
been justified as a means of satisfying society's inherent disap-
proval of outrageous and intolerable conduct.4 6 Thus, the courts
vent society's objection to unacceptable conduct by attempting to
punish the guilty party and further, to deter him and others from
engaging in similar conduct.4 7
Although this principal function for awarding punitive damages
is recognized uniformly, there are additional reasons given for
awards of punitive damages.48 The various purposes include "re-
venge,"' 49 "public justice and providing incentives for private civil
43. A criminal prosecution is not concerned in any way with compensation
of the injured individual against whom the crime is committed, and his only
part in it is that of an accuser and a witness for the state. So far as the
criminal law is concerned, he will leave the courtroom empty-handed.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 7 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER]. Reasoning this out, Prosser states: "The purpose of such a pro-
ceeding is to protect and vindicate the interests of the public as a whole, by punishing
the offender. . . ." He then goes on to say: "The civil action for a tort, on the other
hand, is commenced and maintained by the injured person himself, and its purpose is
to compensate him for the damage he has suffered, at the expense of the wrongdoer."
Id.
44. "Punitive damages, although often criticized, are nonetheless strongly en-
trenched in almost all of the jurisdictions in this country." Note, Punitive Damages
and Liability Insurance: Theory, Reality and Practicality, 9 CuM. L. REv. 487, 488
(1978) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Note, Punitive Damages]. "Currently,
all but four states permit awards of punitive damages in appropriate situations. And
of these four states, all have numerous statutory exceptions to the proscription on this
practice." Belli, Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in Pres-
ent-Day Society, 49 UMKC L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1980) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited
as Belli]; "Despite such denunciations the great majority of states retain the doctrine
of exemplary damages in full force." Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts,
70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 518 (1957) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Note, Exem-
plary Damages].
45. PROSSER, supra note 43, § 2 at 9.
46. Id.; Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages.- Toward A Principled Approach, 31
HASTINGS L. J. 639, 641 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Mallor & Roberts]; Note, Punitive
Damages, supra note 44, at 487-88.
47. PROSSER, supra note 43, § 2 at 9; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1)
(1977); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 275 (1935); T.
SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 347 (9th ed. 1913); Note,
Punitive Damages, supra note 44, at 488.
48. "[D]ifferent rationales have been advanced in support of punitive damages.
Close examination of the cases reveals that these rationales are not used indepen-
dently, rather they usually are found concurrently, with two or more being given by
courts to explain the desirability in allowing these damages." Belli, supra note 44, at
5.
49. "Exemplary damages may also constitute a kind of public revenge by reflect-
ing the jury's indignation at the defendant's conduct." Note, Exemplary Damages,
supra note 44, at 522 (footnote omitted); "The fact remains, however, that courts and
8
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enforcement," 50 and "additional compensation.":" These objec-
tives are often considered to run "concurrently" when interpreting
the usefulness of granting exemplary damages.52
Regardless of the different purposes attributed to punitive dam-
ages, they may not be awarded unless the defendant has acted
with the requisite "state of mind" warranting a punitive sanc-
tion.53 Something more than the mere commission of a tort is
required.
In California, punitive damages are allowed when the defend-
ant has committed a tort with oppression, fraud, or malice.54
Other states have restricted or expanded the required "state of
mind," using other standards of conduct.55
The variation between states on the functional purposes of pu-
nitive damages, and the necessary "state of mind" required can be
attributed to public policy.56 There are several public policy argu-
ments made against the availability of punitive damages.
legal scholars continue to cite it [revenge] as a possible rationale for the promulgation
of punitive damages." Belli, supra note 44, at 5 (footnote omitted).
The fact that punitive damages are also known as vindictive damages gives
hint of still another rationale used to support the doctrine. Such awards are
said to offer an element of revenge both to the injured party and to society
as a whole. The theory is that punitive damages award will cool the wrath
and heal the wounded sense of honor of the injured party and, hopefully,
dissuade him from taking justice into his own hand.
Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 870, 877 (1976)
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Long].
50. Many of the writings and cases on punitive damages hold that the major
reason behind punitive damages is that public justice may be served by
awarding such damages to individual plaintiffs .... Under this theory, re-
ferred to as the "private attorney general" approach, allowance of punitive
damages acts to persuade the injured victim to pursue his claim and also acts
to entice counsel to accept the case.
Belli, supra note 44, at 5-6 (footnote omitted).
All serious misdeeds cannot possibly be punished by government prosecu-
tion. For one thing, not all misconduct is punishable as a crime or a civil
violation; for another, limited judicial and prosecutorial resources permit
prosecution for only a fraction of the crimes and violations committed. For
these reasons, individual members of society must play a significant role in
instituting actions to impose sanctions for serious misconduct.
Mallor & Roberts, supra note 46, at 649.
51. "Some courts, for example, have allowed the jury to consider attorneys' fees
and litigation expenses in fixing the amount of exemplary damages. Although others
reject this procedure, as a practical matter exemplary damages always serve to com-
pensate the plaintiff for these expenses." Note, Exemplary Damages, supra note 44, at
21 (footnotes omitted); see also Belli, supra note 44, at 6; Long, supra note 49, at 875;
PROSSER, supra note 43, § 2 at 11.
52. See supra note 48.
53. Belli, supra note 44, at 8; see also PROSSER, supra note 43, § 2 at 9-10.
54. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 819, 598 P.2d 452, 457,
157 Cal. Rptr. 482, 487 (1979).
55. Long, supra note 49, at 880-81.
56. Belli, supra note 44, at 7.
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Several critics of punitive damages have condemned them
based upon the central function they serve-punishment.5 7 It has
been argued that punitive damages are criminal in nature and in
the absence of procedural safeguards, function contrary to the
protection of constitutional rights.58 Punitive damages have also
been criticized as being a "windfall" for the plaintiff who, in civil
litigation, should receive only just compensation.59 It has also
been contended that punitive damages, assessed for punishment
purposes, should be paid to the government and not the injured
party.60
An additional criticism is that the award of punitive damages is
totally subjective and therefore opens the door for unfair
prejudice. 6' Furthermore, punitive damages have been censured
for subjecting the defendant to punishment in two arenas. The
defendant may be susceptible to both criminal and civil actions.
The possibility of punitive damages in the latter and fines in the
former raises the specter of "double punishment. '' 62 Finally some
have argued that punitive damages have not been an effective de-
terrent.63 Therefore, since deterrence is a primary objective of pu-
nitive damages, there is no justification for the continued presence
of punitive damages in the civil judicial system.
B. Punitive Damages in California
An evaluation of California's policy towards punitive damages
is required to determine their availability in medical malpractice
arbitration. California permits punitive damage awards when
warranted. 6" Since 1872, California has statutorily allowed puni-
tive damages.65 As such, California courts consistently have en-
57. PROSSER, supra note 43, § 2 at 9; Belli, supra note 49, at 8; D. DOBBS, HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DOBBS].
58. "They have been condemned [because lacking are the] ... usual safeguards
thrown about criminal procedure, 'such as proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
the privilege against self-incrimination, and even the rule against double jeopardy
. .. PROSSER, supra note 43, at 11 (footnote omitted); "[b]ecause punitive dam-
ages serve to punish, they must be considered penal; fundamental constitutional crim-
inal safeguards therefore must be applied fully." Belli, supra note 44, at 8 (footnote
omitted); see also DOBBS, supra note 57, at 219.
59. DOBBS, supra note 57, at 219; PROSSER, supra note 43, at 1I; see also Morris,
Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1206 (1931) [hereinafter
cited as Morris].
60. Belli, supra note 44, at 8; Note, Exemplary Damages, supra note 44, at 523;
PROSSER, supra note 43, § 2 at 11.
61. DOBBS, supra note 57, at 219.
62. Note, Exemplary Damages, supra note 44, at 524-25; Mallor & Roberts, supra
note 46, at 645; PROSSER, supra note 43, § 2 at 11.
63. DOBBS, supra note 57, at 200.
64. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1984).
65. "In an action for breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the
[Vol. 20
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forced the application of punitive damages. 66
The major purpose of punitive damages in California is to pun-
ish the defendant, and in so doing, to deter him and others who
may engage in similar conduct.67 It is important to note, that as
well as the exemplary purpose directed at others, deterrence of the
specific defendant is emphasized. 68 This is evident from the judi-
cial practice of granting awards proportionate to the wealth of the
particular defendant.69 However, it is evident that to justify their
continued application, in light of constant challenge, the courts
promote the dual purpose of general and specific deterrence.70
While California justifies the award of punitive damages, they
are not unconditionally approved. 7' The California courts have
made it quite clear that punitive damages are not favored in the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to
the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of
punishing the defendant." CAL. CiV. CODE § 3294a (West Supp. 1984).
66. Peterson v. Superior Ct., 31 Cal. 3d 147, 642 P.2d 1305, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784
(1982).
67. "[T]he purpose of punitive damages is to penalize wrongdoers in a way that
will deter them and others from repeating the wrongful conduct in the future." Wyatt
v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 790, 598 P.2d 45, 55, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392, 402
(1979) (citation omitted); "[Tlhe principal purpose of punitive damages is to deter and
punish. ... Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 750, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 237, 243 (Ct. App. 1980); "The primary purpose of punitive damages is 'to pe-
nalize wrongdoers in a way that will deter them and others from repeating the wrong-
ful conduct in the future.'" Peterson, 31 Cal. 3d at 155, 642 P.2d at 1309, 181 Cal.
Rptr. at 788 (quoting Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 790, 598 P.2d 45,
55, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392, 402 (1979)).
68. Peterson, 31 Cal. 3d at 156, 642 P.2d at 1309, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 788; Wyatt, 24
Cal. 3d at 790, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 402, 598 P.2d at 55.
69. "Since the principal purpose of punitive damages is to deter and punish, the
wealth of the defendant is always a proper consideration." Rosener, 110 Cal. App. 3d
at 750, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 243 (citation omitted); "Likewise applicable is the principle
that, the purpose of punitive damages being to punish the defendant and make an
example of him, 'the wealthier the wrongdoing defendant, the larger the award of
exemplary damages need be in order to accomplish the statutory objective.'" Zhadan
v. Downtown L.A. Motors. 66 Cal. App. 3d 481, 496, 136 Cal. Rptr. 132, 140 (Ct.
App. 1976) (quoting Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 65, 529 P.2d 608,
624, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184, 200 (1974)).
70. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 482 (1979); Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 598 P.2d 45, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 392 (1979); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr.
348 (Ct. App. 1981); Schomer v. Smidt, 113 Cal. App. 3d 828, 170 Cal. Rptr. 662 (Ct.
App. 1980); Miller v. Elite Ins. Co., 100 Cal. App. 3d 739, 161 Cal. Rptr. 322 (Ct. App.
1980).
71. "[W]e must be guided by the well-established principle that punitive damages
are not favored in the law." Rosener, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 750, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 243
(citations omitted); "Such damages are never awarded as a matter of right; they are
not favored by the law and they should be granted with the greatest of caution; they
will be allowed only in the clearest of cases." Henderson v. Security Nat. Bank, 72
Cal. App. 3d 764, 771, 140 Cal. Rptr. 388, 392 (Ct. App. 1977) (citations omitted).
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law.72 California has appraised punitive damages as possible ex-
cessive compensation for the injured party,73 thus providing a
"windfall" to the plaintiff making for an unappealing remedy.74
They continue, however, to be supported in proper cases.75
Although California manifestly authorizes the application of
punitive damages, approval is not without reluctance. In deter-
mining whether punitive damages will be permitted in medical
malpractice arbitration, California's prudent posture on these
damages will play a significant role.
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA-THE CONFLICT
Under California law, an arbitrator's award which commands
an act against public policy will be vacated because it exceeds the
scope of his authority.76 Therefore, the issue in determining if an
arbitrator can award punitive damages is whether public policy 77
72. Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d at 750, 168 Cal. Rptr. at
243; Henderson v. Security Nat. Bank, 72 Cal. App. 3d at 771, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 392,
73. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
74. Wolfsen v. Hathaway, 32 Cal. 2d 632, 647-48, 198 P.2d 1, 11 (1948); Josener,
110 Cal. App. 3d at 750, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 242; Henderson, 72 Cal. App. 3d at 771, 140
Cal. Rptr. at 392; Beck v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 347, 355,
126 Cal. Rptr. 602, 607 (Ct. App. 1976); Ferraro v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 8 Cal. App. 3d
339, 355, 87 Cal. Rptr. 226, 236 (Ct. App. 1970).
75. Wolfsen v. Hathaway, 32 Cal. 2d 632, 647-48, 198 P.2d 1, 11 (1948); Rosener,
110 Cal. App. 3d at 750, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 242;Henderson, 72 Cal. App. 3d at 771, 140
Cal. Rptr. at 392; Beck v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 347, 355,
126 Cal. Rptr. 602, 607 (Ct. App. 1976); Ferraro v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 8 Cal. App. 3d
339, 355, 87 Cal. Rptr. 226, 236 (Ct. App. 1970).
76. American & Nat'l Leagues of Players Baseball Clubs v. Major League Base-
ball Players Ass'n, 59 Cal. App. 3d 493, 498, 130 Cal. Rptr. 626, 628 (1976); See also
Viola, Inc. v. Santa Barbara High School Dist., 276 Cal. App. 2d 425, 427, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 784, 786 (Ct. App. 1969).
77. This Comment only addresses the issue of whether "public policy" prohibits
awards of punitive damages in medical malpractice arbitration. The concept of pub-
lic policy is not inherently subject to precise definition. Safeway Stores v. Retail
Clerks Int'l. Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 567, 575, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (1953). Generally public
policy directly corresponds to and encompasses social practice. F. FROHOCK, PUBLIC
POLICY SCOPE AND LOGIC § 1, at 11-12 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FROHOCK]. Public
policy is a patterned attempt to resolve conflicting claims or provide incentives to
achieve agreed upon goals. Id. The range of public policy is enormous, encompass-
ing both material and ethical issues. Id. Public policy concerns that which benefits
and improves the social, moral, and physical condition of the community. S & V.
R.R. Co. v. City of Stockton, 41 Cal. 147, 175 (1871). If an activity does not promote
the general welfare or has a negative effect on social betterment, it is against public
policy. In other words, that which contravenes good morals or the conventional inter-
ests of society will be against public policy. Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn,
Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 796, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769, 771 (1961).
The public policy of any state may be found in its constitution, the acts of its legis-
lature and decisions of its courts. Building Service Employees Int'l. Union v. Gaz-
zam, 339 U.S. 532, 537 (1950); Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerk Int'l. Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d
567, 574, 261 P.2d 721, 725 (1953). The determination of public policy is primarily for
12
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prohibits him from doing so. This section will examine the crucial
policy considerations the California courts will face in determin-
ing the availability of punitive damages in medical malpractice
arbitration.
A. The New York Rule-Punitive Damages in Arbitration
1. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart Inc. -The case of Garrity v. Lyle Stu-
art Inc. ,7 involved a commercial suit in which arbitrators
awarded $45,000 in compensatory damages and $7,500 in punitive
damages.79 The conflict concerned a defendant publisher who,
among other wrongful acts, maliciously withheld royalties owed
to the plaintiff author. The publishing agreement contained an
arbitration clause, which in turn brought the dispute to arbitra-
tion. The arbitrators awarded plaintiff both compensatory and
punitive damages pursuant to plaintiff's request. After several ap-
peals the case reached New York's highest court. The New York
Court of Appeals, in a four to three decision, held the arbitrators
had no power to award punitive damages.80 The court held the
award of punitive damages would exceed the arbitrator's author-
ity, even if the parties had specifically provided in their agreement
for punitive damages.8' The majority based its conclusion upon a
strong state public policy disfavoring punitive damages in
arbitration.8 2
When determining why this form of award in arbitration con-
travenes public policy, the majority stated several concerns. The
most critical of these concerns dealt with the purpose of punitive
damages in the civil judicial process. The court reasoned punitive
the legislature of the state. Id. However, in the absence of legislation, courts must
define public policy. Id. See also A. CORBIN, CoNrrAcTs § 1374 (1952) [hereinafter
cited as CORBIN]. The determination will reflect those values which represent the
court's interpretation of what benefits the public welfare. Wells & Grossman, The
Concept of Judicial Policy-Making: A Critique, 15 JUR. PUB. L. 286, 293-94 (1966).
Often the courts must make a decision when prevailing political, social and economic
views are influx. CORBIN, Supra note 77, at 1374-75. Thus, the final determination as
to what is, or is not, against public policy will entail a weighing of the considerations
and a subjective calculation of effect.
78. The leading case authority on the issue of punitive damages awards in arbi-
tration is Garrity v. Lyle Stuart Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d
831 (1976). Labor is an additional field in which the issue of punitive damages in
arbitration has controversy surrounding it. Since labor law and arbitration have pe-
culiar issues within that specific field, discussion of the controversy therein will be
excluded in this Comment. For a summary analysis of punitive damages in labor
arbitration, see Travers, Arbitrator's Power to Award Punitive Damages, Annot. 83
ALR 3d 1037.
79. Garrity, 40 N.Y.2d at 355, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
80. Id. at 356, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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damages were appropriate where the defendant's conduct was so
reprehensible that the damages not only punish, but more impor-
tantly deter the defendant and others from engaging in similar
conduct in the future.83 Since punitive damages function primar-
ily as a "social exemplary remedy," they should not be applied as
a "private compensatory remedy. ' 84 Therefore, since arbitration
is purely a private proceeding,85 a remedy of punitive damages in
arbitration would not be in furtherance of the social purpose of
these damages. Although not determinative, the majority also ex-
pounded the generally accepted policy against punitive damage
awards in breach of contract actions.86 This policy is based on the
theory that in an action for breach of contract, the parties seek
relief from a "private wrong" as opposed to a "public right. 87
The Garrity court also discussed the impact punitive damages
might have upon the function and purpose of arbitration. That
purpose being the speedy, inexpensive, and final resolution of dis-
putes. The court reasoned that since there is only limited judicial
review of arbitration rulings, a serious injustice might result re-
garding the imposition of punitive damage awards.88 The Garrity
court was concerned because manipulation of the arbitrator by a
party with superior bargaining power might influence the applica-
tion of these damages.8 9 Therefore, judicial review would eventu-
ally be imperative, and the purpose of having an arbitration
hearing would be defeated.90
The majority in Garrity concluded that an award of punitive
damages in arbitration is against public policy and exceeds the
authority of the arbitrator. Thus, the court modified the award,
vacating the imposition of punitive damages. 91
The dissent in Garrity warrants consideration.92 The dissent
stated that courts should only intrude upon arbitration awards
where the interests of the public clearly outweigh the concerns of
83. Id. at 358, 353 N.E.2d at 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
84. Id.
85. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
86. "Punitive damages awards are of growing importance in tort litigation. Tra-
ditionally, however, punitive damages are not awarded in contract actions, no matter
how malicious the breach." J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 14:3 at 520 (1977) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as CALAMARI & PERILLO];
see also Garrity, 40 N.Y.2d at 358, 353 N.E.2d at 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
87. Garrity, 40 N.Y.2d at 358, 353 N.E.2d at 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833 (1976).
88. "In the usual case, the court stops only to inquire if the award is authorized
by the contract; is complete and final on its face; and if the proceeding was fairly
conducted." Id. at 358-59, 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
89. Id. at 358, 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833-34.
90. Id. at 358-59, 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
91. Id. at 360, 353 N.E.2d at 797, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
92. Id. at 360, 353 N.E,2d at 797, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 835 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
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the parties to the arbitration. 93 The dissent noted an absence of
legislation even alluding to a notion disfavoring punitive damages
in arbitration.94 Further, the dissenting opinion stressed the
strong public policy favoring resolution of disputes through arbi-
tration.95 Hence, the dissentors would have held that regardless of
any disapproval of punitive damages in arbitration, such disfavor
was insufficient to warrant judicial intervention.96
The New York court's majority and dissenting opinions in Gar-
rity each strongly state convincing arguments. Therefore, al-
though a ruling by a California court on this issue will depend on
additional concerns and policies,97 as a benchmark, the Garrity
decision will provide a basis upon which California courts may
proceed.
2. The Effect of Garrity.-The Garrity ruling is influential for
two reasons. Garrity will be persuasive because New York is rec-
ognized for having developed an abundance of case law and ex-
pertise in the field of arbitration.98 Futher, as the only state whose
courts have specifically ruled upon the public policy of punitive
damages in arbitration, 99 it must be considered. Absent a differ-
ence in public policy, it would be easier for California to adopt
rather than reject the New York Court of Appeals reasoning.
However, there are some important facts about Garrity which
may diminish its influence when considered by California courts.
Of considerable significance is the split in the New York court in
deciding Garrity. The majority opinion was backed by only four
of the seven justices. 00 The dissenting opinion urged a very
strong argument supporting punitive damages in medical mal-
practice arbitration. What the dissent presented was a "hands-
off' policy to arbitration interference.10 1 The dissent argued that
unless the interests of the public clearly outweighed the relations
of the parties, interference would not be justified. 0 2 They rein-
forced their position claiming the state's strong public policy
93. Id. at 365, 363 N.E.2d at 800, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
94. Id. at 363, 353 N.E.2d at 799, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 837.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Further elaboration on relevant distinctions between the Garrity decision,
and the issue of medical malpractice arbitration awards of punitive damages in Cali-
fornia will be covered in more detail in the section infra on "The Effect of Garrity."
98. Note, Damages in Arbitration, LAW ARB. LETrER Sept. 1978 at 193, 196
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Damages in Arbitration].
99. Id.
100. See supra notes 80, 92 and accompanying text.
101. See Garrity, 40 N.Y.2d at 365, 353 N.E.2d at 800, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 838
(Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
102. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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favoring arbitration was not outweighed by the policy against pu-
nitive damages. Hence, there should not be a public policy
against the award of punitive damages in arbitration. 03 Califor-
nia, too, has a strong public policy favoring resolution of disputes
through "private judging,"' 0 4 especially in medical malpractice
arbitration. 10 5 Therefore, the dissenting opinion in Garrity may
be more persuasive to California courts than that of the majority.
An additional factor affecting the influence of Garrity in Cali-
fornia is the differing degree of importance arbitration in medical
malpractice has in California as compared to New York. Unlike
California, the New York legislature has not encouraged arbitra-
tion as a means of resolving the medical malpractice crisis. 10 6
This indicates that in the resolution of such disputes, California's
public policy favoring arbitrated settlements is stronger than New
York's.
The subject matter of the Garrity case will also play a role in
determining its influence. Although in Garrity there was wrongful
conduct sufficient to warrant punitive damages, the controversy
centered on a breach of contract. 0 7 Clearly there is a distinction
to be made between commercial arbitration and arbitration of tor-
tious conduct. The adherence of courts in both New York and
California to the rule that punitive damages have no place in con-
tract is not disputed. 0 8 Punitive damages, however, are consid-
ered appropriate when independent tortious conduct accompanies
the breach of contract.'0 9 Even then, courts are reluctant to pro-
vide punitive damages in the area of contract, regardless of the
presence of conduct warranting punitive sanctions." 10 In Garrity,
the court was forced to deal with public policy on punitive dam-
ages in both a breach of contract case and arbitration. This is a
significant factor to be considered by California's courts, espe-
cially since in medical malpractice the issue is negligence, not
breach of contract.
103. See supra notes 93, 95-96 and accompanying text.
104. Knight, supra note 16, at 108.
105. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
106. At present thirteen states, excluding New York, specifically support medical
malpractice arbitration. They are: Alabama, Alaska, California, Georgia, Illinois,
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Vermont, and Vir-
ginia. Bassis, supra note 1, at 264 n.23.
107. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831
(1976).
108. See supra note 103 and accompanying text; Mayes v. Sturdy Northern Sales,
Inc., 91 Cal. App. 3d 69, 82, 154 Cal. Rptr. 43, 52 (Ct. App. 1979); Walker v. Signal
Cos., Inc., 84 Cal. App. 3d 982, 996, 149 Cal. Rptr. 119, 126 (Ct. App. 1978).
109. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 86, § 14-3 at 520-21.
110. Id. at 520.
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B. The Balance of Interests-Punitive Damages and Arbitration
A decision by California courts on punitive damages in medical
malpractice arbitration will affect the principles behind both puni-
tive damages and arbitration. This section will address possible
public policy arguments regarding the justification for allowing
punitive damages in medical malpractice arbitration.
California adheres to a conservative application of punitive
damages insisting that they should be awarded primarily for a so-
cial exemplary purpose. 1 Arbitration "hearings" are private and
not matters of public record." 2 A strong argument can be made
that since the public is not aware of matters in arbitration, the
community does not benefit by application of punitive damages in
these totally private proceedings. As noted by the Garrity court,
punitive damages function almost entirely as a "social exemplary
remedy"; they should not serve as a "private compensatory
remedy."113
Two arguments, however, may answer this objection. First,
there has been much criticism of the "exemplary" and "deterrent"
effect of punitive damages.' 14 Some legal scholars argue that pu-
nitive damages have not effectively deterred the conduct of
others.115 Arguably something more than mere deterrence is
served by assessing punitive damages. 116 Although California
courts have not directly recognized any alternative purposes for
punitive damages, 1 7 authorities in the field have recognized that
courts must look to "concurrent" purposes of such an award.11 8
This is due to the questionable effectiveness of the deterrence
function. Second, in addition to "concurrent" functions, the "pe-
nal" function of punitive damages remains intact in medical mal-
practice arbitration.
California's recognized purpose of punitive damages is topenal-
ize wrongdoers in a way that will deter them as well as others from
repeating the wrongful conduct in the future.' 19 When interpret-
ing this language, two distinct aims can be extrapolated. Aside
from setting an example for others in society, the chastisement
11. Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 750, 168 Cal. Rptr.
237, 243 (1980); see also supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
115. Id.
116. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
119. Peterson v. Superior Ct., 31 Cal. 3d 147, 155, 642 P.2d 1305, 1309, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 784, 788 (1982).
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and deterrence of the specific wrongdoer is promulgated as
well.'20 The California courts stress the importance of penalizing
and effectively deterring the specific wrongdoer by assessing an
amount of damages which will sufficiently punish the defend-
ant. 1 1 This is done to insure that the defendant suffers the conse-
quences of his reprehensible conduct to a degree that will deter
him. 2 2 Therefore, in arbitration the penal function of punitive
damages will be effective, at least against the specific wrongdoer.
California courts would also consider the interrelation between
punitive damages and medical malpractice arbitration. The court
should focus on the protection of arbitration as a viable forum
and its salutory role in the medical malpractice crisis. 23 Califor-
nia has a strong public policy favoring arbitration of medical mal-
practice cases. 124 The California courts have noted emphatically
the benefits that arbitration of medical malpractice disputes pro-
vides to both the community and the judicial system. 25 Also,
California's legislature has exhibited approval of arbitration in
medical malpractice. 126
The California courts have interpreted the legislative guidelines
for arbitration as granting almost unrestricted authority to the ar-
bitrators. 2 7 The entire statutory framework in California was
designed to give the arbitrator the "broadest possible powers.' 128
Thus, an argument can be made that the power to award punitive
damages should not be denied to arbitrators. Prohibiting arbitra-
tors from awarding punitive damages would contradict the strong
public policy favoring uninhibited use of arbitration in medical
malpractice. The unavailability of punitive damages in medical
malpractice arbitration would become a "strategic factor" for par-
ties choosing between this mechanism and courtroom litigation. 2 9
A limitation of punitive damages, which could result in large re-
120. See id. at 155-56, 642 P.2d at 1309, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
121. Zhadan v. Downtown L.A. Motors, 66 Cal. App. 3d 481, 496, 136 Cal. Rptr.
132, 140 (1976); see also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
122. Zhadan v. Downtown L.A. Motors, 66 Cal. App. 3d 481, 496, 136 Cal. Rptr.
132, 140 (1976); see also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 3, 4 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
125. "There is a strong judicial policy in this state favoring arbitration over litiga-
tion as a means of settling disputes, including disputes arising out of medical mal-
practice claims, because arbitration is less expensive and more expeditious than
litigation and moreover relieves court congestion." Hawkins v. Superior Ct., 89 Cal.
App. 3d 413, 416, 152 Cal. Rptr. 491, 493 (Ct. App. 1979) (citations omitted).
126. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
127. Marcus v. Superior Ct., 75 Cal. App. 3d 204, 210, 141 Cal. Rptr. 890, 892-93
(Ct. App. 1977).
128. Id.
129. Bassis, supra note 1, at 267.
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coveries, 130 may lead claimants to refuse to agree to arbitration.13 1
Regardless of the strong policy favoring arbitration, the argu-
ment can be made that this policy does not justify circumventing
the main purpose behind punitive damages.1 32 Further, arbitra-
tion is not a panacea; it has faults and problems that have not
gone unnoticed. 33 To unnecessarily grant additional power to ar-
bitrators may undermine the desired general effect of arbitration.
Of particular relevance is the potential for subjecting arbitration
decisions to judicial review. If punitive damages are allowed in
arbitration, judicial supervision may eventually be needed.1 34 Ju-
dicial review would undermine the finality, speed, and inexpen-
siveness of arbitration.135  Therefore, allowance of punitive
damages may impair the very functional existence of arbitration.
The issue of whether to permit awards of punitive damages in
medical malpractice arbitration will be decided by weighing these
and similar competing policy considerations. The courts must de-
termine whether the policy favoring arbitration or that disfavoring
punitive damages will control. In other words, they must decide
which will be most beneficial to the general public. 36
CONCLUSION
Judicial determination of public policy is subjective in na-
ture.137 It is not possible to determine precisely whether Califor-
nia courts will permit punitive damages in medical malpractice
arbitration; however, a calculated prediction may be made.
The statutory framework in California for arbitration is
designed to give the arbitrator the "broadest possible powers."'
38
Despite the liberal nature of procedural and evidentiary require-
130. Bertero v. Nat'l. Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184,
(1974); Zhadan v. Downtown L.A. Motors, 66 Cal. App. 3d 481, 136 Cal. Rptr. 132
(1976).
131. Bassis, supra note 1, at 267.
132. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, 40 N.Y.2d 354, 356, 353 N.E.2d 793, 794, 386
N.Y.S.2d 831, 832 (1976).
133. "Emphatically, arbitration is not a panacea. It does not magically preclude
liability. It is not appropriate for every situation. It may even create problems if
implemented improperly or without provisions tailoring a wide variety of possible
procedures and mechanisms to particular clients' requirements." Butler, supra note 3,
at 42; "[Alrbitration of medical malpractice disputes has not been without its faults,
thus presenting legitimate problems for resolution." Bassis, supra note 1, at 265 (foot-
note omitted).
134. See supra notes 89, 90 and accompanying text.
135. Id.
136. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
137. See generally FROHOCK, supra note 77.
138. Marcus v. Superior Ct., 75 Cal. App. 3d 204, 210, 141 Cal. Rptr. 890, 892 (Ct.
App. 1977).
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ments in arbitration, the "hearing" is conducted as though it were
a judicial proceeding. The arbitrators function as judge and jury,
pursuant to the wishes of the parties. The arbitrators have the
authority to pass on any legal or factual issue which is part of the
controversy involved. 139 Unless the parties specifically provide
that punitive damages shall not be within the authority of the ar-
bitrator,1 40 there does not seem to be cause to restrict their appli-
cation. The arbitrator's award is totally within his discretion. 141
The final award granted by the arbitrator is almost always con-
firmed, regardless of the amount considered adequate. 42 The
mere fact that a portion of the award is annexed punitive damages
should not be repugnant.
Further, when punitive damages are justfied, it seems illogical
that an award of such would go unquestioned had the parties liti-
gated in court, rather than arbitrate. Procedural safeguards still
exist for the defendant in arbitration. If the defendant can show
that fraud, substantial error, or an excess of jurisdiction was pr-
sent in the arbitration decision, an appeal will be permitted. 43
In addition, the punishment and deterrent aspects of punitive
damages will remain intact in arbitration. The defendant in arbi-
tration is punished by the application of punitive damages. If pu-
nitive damages actually serve to deter future conduct, the
defendant is not likely to repeat his wrongful acts. It should not
make a difference how many individuals are deterred, so long as
the defendant himself is inhibited from engaging in the same con-
duct in the future.
Finally, the possible detriment to the viability of arbitration by
forbidding punitive damages outweighs the general purpose of the
social exemplary stigma. If potential arbitration recovery is se-
verely limited by the absence of punitive damages in arbitration,
plaintiffs are unlikely to heed legislative encouragement to resort
to this mechanism. To inhibit the use of arbitration, especially in
medical malpractice cases, is simply illogical. Incentives, not de-
terrents, are required if arbitration is to prove at all helpful in the
mitigation of the medical malpractice crisis.
Therefore, given the relative degree of infringement upon the
principal purpose of punitive damages, and the relative emphasis
on the need for arbitration, the California courts should not fol-
139. Id. at 210, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 892-93.
140. See Delta Lines, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 66 Cal. App. 3d 960, 966, 136
Cal. Rptr. 345, 349 (1977).
141. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
142. Butler, supra note 3, at 66.
143. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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low the lead of the New York courts on this issue. California will
probably rule that punitive damage awards in medical malprac-
tice arbitration are not against public policy.
Paul M. Nussbaum *
* I dedicate this publication to my parents, Dr. & Mrs. Arnold Nussbaum
whose love, support and encouragement has enabled me to believe in myself, and
achieve beyond my wildest expectations.
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